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Rulemaking Under Section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act: The SEC Exceeds Its Reach
in Attempting to Pull The Plug on Multiple
Proration Pools
I. INTRODUCTION
Few agencies have had a greater effect upon their areas of ex-
pertise through rulemaking than has the Securities and Exchange
Commission. In certain areas of the securities industry, in which
the inherent complexity of the industry engenders almost constant
innovation and change,1 Congress has chosen to develop a regula-
tory scheme that depends largely upon the rulemaking of the SEC
for clarity and effectiveness. Moreover, in forming this regulatory
structure, the SEC aggressively has pursued the role of guardian of
the congressional intents underlying the federal securities laws.
The Commission, however, recently sought to plumb the limits of
its rulemaking authority under sections 14(e) and 23(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) through its adoption
of revised rule 14d-8.2 Because this new rule 14d-8 directly con-
flicts with section 14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act' by altering the
statutorily prescribed minimum ten day period for pro rata accept-
ance by a bidder making a partial tender offer, the SEC's adoption
of revised rule 14d-8 raises new questions concerning the rulemak-
ing reach of the Commission under the broad enabling language of
sections 14(e) and 23(a).
In 1968 Congress amended the Exchange Act by enacting the
Williams Act,4 which subjects tender offers to the regulatory super-
vision of the SEC.5 Before the adoption of the Williams Act, the
1. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 15 & 10 for the texts of §§ 14(e) and 23(a) and rule 14d-8,
respectively.
3. See infra notes 9-15 & 61-65 and accompanying text. For the text of § 14(d)(6), see
infra note 8.
4. The Williams Act is the popular name for Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968),
which amended §§ 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), and 16 and added §§ 14(c), 14(d), and 14(f) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Williams Act takes its name from Sen. Harrison Wil-
liams of New Jersey, one of its prime sponsors and most vocal advocates. Congress subse-
quently amended §§ 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), and 14(e) of the Exchange Act in 1970 when it
adopted Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970).
5. In addition to the provisions of the Williams Act, tender offers are subject to regu-
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tender offer was virtually free from scrutiny under the securities
laws.6 One specific congressional concern that helped to prompt
such legislation was the tender offer for only part of the target cor-
poration's outstanding shares and the consequential pressure on
target shareholders to tender their shares quickly or risk the over-
subscription of the offer.7 To place the shareholders of the target
and the acquiring corporation on a more equal footing, Congress
adopted section 14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act, which provides that
the bidding corporation must accept on a pro rata basis all shares
tendered within ten days of the offer."
lations 14D and 14E, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1-.14d-9, .14e-1-.14e-3 (1983), which the SEC has
promulgated to regulate the activities incident to a tender offer. One commentator, however,
has noted a challenge to the authority of the Commission to promulgate rule 14e-2. Leiser,
The SEC: A Black Knight for Target Management - An Analysis of Some Recent SEC
Rules and Proposed Rules, 7 J. CORP. L. 21, 36 (1981) ("Some authorities believe that the
legislative history and statutory language of the Williams Act require the conclusion that
the SEC has exceeded the limits of its rule making power by requiring management to re-
spond to a tender offer with a recommendation and reasons for that recommendation."
(footnote omitted)). For other commentary on the Commission's activities under the Wil-
liams Act, see Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing the Takeover Game: The Securities
and Exchange Commission's Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARv. J.
LEGIS. 409 (1980); Jupiter, An Analysis of Efforts to Avoid Williams Act Requirements, 9
SEc. REG. L.J. 259 (1981) (various methods of making tender offers and avoiding the limita-
tions of the Williams Act); Manges, SEC Regulation of Issuer and Third-Party Tender
Offers, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 275 (1981) (comparison of regulation for issuer and third-party
tender offers); Thigpen, Cash Offers, Capital Market Discipline, and the 1968 Legislation
Revisited, 49 TENN. L. Rav. 1 (1981); Current Issues in Tender Offers, 7 J. CORP. L. 503
(1982); Note, Expansion of the Williams Act: Tender Offer Regulation for Non-conven-
tional Purchases, 11 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 277 (1980) (definition of a tender offer); Note,
Problems in the Regulation of Tender Offers: The Williams Act, State Takeover Statutes,
and SEC Rules, 13 TULSA L.J. 552 (1978); Symposium, The Federal Scheme of Tender
Offer Regulation, 7 J. CORP. L. 525 (1982).
6. The legislative history of the Williams Act relates that prior to the Act's passage
the federal securities laws did not require a party making a cash tender offer to disclose
"[its] identity, the source of [its] funds, who [its] associates are, or what [it] intends to do if
[it] gains control of the corporation." H.R. RaP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2812 [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT ON WmLums Acr]. Although the Securities Act of 1933 had required extensive dis-
closure to shareholders in stock-for-stock exchanges and proxy contests, cash tender offers
were subject only to "the most minimal disclosure" even though the shareholders of the
target still faced the same basic decision whether to tender their shares. Id. at 3, 1968 U.S.
CODa CONG. & AD. NEws at 2813.
7. Id. at 2, 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2812; see also Indiana Nat'l Bank v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 (S.D. Ind. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1978)
("[Section] 14(d)(6) was enacted to remove the pressures of the first-come, first-purchased
practices." (citation omitted)).
8. Section 14(d)(6) provides:
Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders, for less
than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater number of
securities is deposited pursuant thereto within ten days after copies of the offer or
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In light of recent developments in the use of partial tender
offers in multistep transactions,9 the SEC adopted a revised ver-
sion of rule 14d-810 that effectively extends the proration period
for partial tender offers to twenty days.1" The Commission - over
rare dissenting opinions by Chairman Shad1 2 and Commissioner
Treadway1 3 - determined that the extended proration period was
necessary to protect shareholders from the pressures of the bewil-
dering array of multiple proration periods that may characterize a
takeover battle. 4 Nevertheless, because the revised rule effectively
request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders than such
person is bound or willing to take up and pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken
up as nearly as may be pro rata, disregarding fractions, according to the number of
securities deposited by each depositor. The provisions of this subsection shall also ap-
ply to securities deposited within ten days after notice of an increase in the considera-
tion offered to security holders, as described in paragraph (7), is first published or sent
or given to security holders.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
9. See infra notes 36 & 66-80 and accompanying text.
10. Pro Rata Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 19336 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 83,306 (Dec. 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Adoption Release]. Rule
14d-8 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the pro rata provisions of section 14(d)(6) of the Act, if any per-
son makes a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, for less than all of the
outstanding equity securities of a class, and if a greater number of securities are depos-
ited pursuant thereto than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay for, the
securities taken up and paid for shall be taken up and paid for as nearly as may be pro
rata, disregarding fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by each
depositor during the period such offer, request or invitation remains open.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983). For a news account and analysis of the Commission's action,
see Greene & Nathan, The SEC's New Prorationing Rule Will Change 'Partial' Tender
Offers, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 10, 1983, at 38, col. 1.
11. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
14. A bidding corporation in a partial tender offer establishes a proration pool when it
accepts tendered shares during the period for pro rata acceptance. This quantity of shares is
a "pool" because the bidder only purchases from the shareholders on a pro rata basis if the
tender offer is over-subscribed. Multiple proration pools develop when the bidder increases
the per share price of its offer because § 14(d)(6) states that it "shall also apply to securities
deposited within ten days after notice of an increase in the consideration offered." The bid-
der, however, may determine to give preferential treatment to those shareholders who ten-
dered into the first pool. For example, assume Corporation B makes a tender offer for
1,000,000 shares of Corporation T (3,000,000 shares outstanding) at $10.00 per share. At the
conclusion of the pro rata acceptance period, shareholders of T have tendered only 600,000
shares. Consequently, B increases its offer to $12.00 per share and establishes a second pro-
ration pool. If another 600,000 shares are tendered into the second pool B may elect to
purchase only 400,000 shares on a pro rata basis from the second pool but all 600,000 from
the first. All shareholders, of course, receive $12.00 per share under Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976). For the Commission's discussion of multiple
proration pools in the context of a hostile takeover fight among several bidders, see infra
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contradicts the literal provisions of section 14(d)(6) of the Ex-
change Act, the Commission's authority to adopt such a provision
under sections 14(e) or 23(a)15 is highly suspect.
This Recent Development first considers the problems that
gave rise to the adoption of revised rule 14d-8, the rationale that
three members of the Commission articulated in support of the
rule,' and the rationale of the two members who opposed it.17 The
Recent Development then examines two judicial decisions, one
that considers the validity of the current tender offer practices
under the Williams Act and rule 14d-8'8 and another that analyzes
the rulemaking authority of the SEC under sections 14(e) and
23(a) of the Exchange Act. 9 Relying primarily upon congressional
hearings20 and debates,2' the Recent Development next discusses
the stated congressional purposes underlying both section 14(d)(6)
of the Exchange Act and the SEC's rulemaking authority under
section 14(e).22 In light of this legislative history, the cases address-
note 37.
15. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders
in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and pre-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (emphasis added). The
1970 amendments added the italicized portion of the section. Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84
Stat. 1497, 1497-98 (1970).
Section 23(a)(1) provides in relevant part as follows:
The Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the
other agencies enumerated in section 78c(a)(34) of this title shall each have power to
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the
provisions of this chapter for which they are responsible or for the execution of the
functions vested in them by this chapter, and may for such purposes classify persons,
securities, transactions, statements, applications, reports, and other matters within
their respective jurisdictions, and prescribe greater, lesser, or different requirements for
different classes thereof...
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1976).
16. See infra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 81-110 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
22. This Recent Development focuses primarily upon § 14(e) because the Commission
views that section as the principle source of its authority to adopt revised rule 14d-8. See
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ing multiple proration pools, and the Commission's rulemaking
function, this Recent Development concludes that the SEC ex-
ceeded its rulemaking authority by promulgating revised rule 14d-
8.22 The Recent Development advocates the presentation to Con-
gress of the competing concerns that the debate over revised rule
14d-8 reflects and recommends congressional consideration and ac-
tion. In addition, the Recent Development urges the Commission
to follow a more cautious approach in its rulemaking activities to
avoid endangering the flexibility necessary for effective securities
regulation. 4
II. THE REvISION OF RULE 14d-8
Prior to the Commission's recent revision, rule 14d-8 merely
allowed a bidder making a tender offer voluntarily to extend the
period for pro rata acceptance to the life of the tender offer.2"
While the SEC's statutory authority to establish that option
through the prior rule 14d-8 is unclear, the courts and the various
constituencies of the securities industry apparently accepted with-
out protest the optional extension of the proration period. Of
course, the nonobligatory nature of prior rule 14d-8 did not give
acquisition-minded companies and those persons interested in pro-
moting tender offers any cause for consternation.2 ' Nevertheless,
regardless of whether the Commission staff viewed the optional ex-
tention in the prior rule as a prelude to the mandatory extension
of revised rule 14d-8, one now may view the latter as a logical next
step from the former.
infra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
25. The original version of rule 14d-8 provided:
The limited pro rata provisions of section 14(d)(6) of the Act shall not apply to any
tender offer for less than all the outstanding securities of the class for which the tender
offer is made to the extent that the bidder provides in the tender offer materials dis-
seminated to security holders on the date of commencement of the tender offer that in
the event more securities are deposited during the period(s) described in paragraphs
(a) and/or (b) of this section than the bidder is bound or willing to accept for payment,
all securities deposited during such period(s) will be accepted for payment as nearly as
practicable on a pro rate basis, disregarding fractions, according to the number of se-
curities deposited by each depositor.
(a) Any period which exceeds ten days from the date of commencement of the tender
offer.
(b) Any period which exceeds ten days from the date that notice of an increase in the
consideration offered is first published, sent or given to security holders.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1982).
26. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Because rule 14e-1 provides that a tender offer must remain
open for at least twenty days21 rule 14d-8's extension of the pro
rata period to the life of a tender offer effectively doubles the mini-
mum statutory proration period of ten days that section 14(d)(6)
of the Exchange Act established.28 In adopting revised rule 14d-8
pursuant to sections 14(e) and 23(a) of the Exchange Act,2' the
SEC maintained that the extended proration period "is essential to
assure security holders the time necessary to consider the merits of
an offer and to obtain sufficient information upon which to base
their investment decisions and to minimize the potential security
holder confusion and misunderstanding generated by changing
proration periods and multiple proration pools."30
A. The Majority's Rationale
In the release proposing revised rule 14d-8,-1 the SEC ac-
knowledged that an extension of the proration period could entail
a decrease in the percentage of tendered securities that the bidder
actually purchases and an increase in the probability that target
management could block the tender offer through defensive tac-
tics. 2 The SEC cited its adoption of regulation 14E'33 of which rule
14e-1 is a part, as evidence of the SEC's concern that "security
27. Rule 14e-1 provides in relevant part:
As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts
or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, no person who makes a
tender offer shall:
(a) Hold such tender offer open for less than twenty business days from the date
such tender offer is first published or sent or given to security holders: Provided, how-
ever, That this paragraph shall not apply to a tender offer by the issuer of the class of a
securities being sought which is not made in anticipation of or in response to another
person's tender offer for securities of the same class.
(b) Increase the offered consideration or the dealer's soliciting fee to be given in a
tender offer unless such tender offer remains open for at least ten business days from
the date that notice of such increase is first published or sent or given to security hold-
ers: Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not apply to a tender offer by the
issuer of the class of securities being sought which is not made in anticipation of or in
response to another person's tender offer for securities of the same class.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1983).
28. Proposed Pro Rata Tender Offer Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 18761, [1982
Transfer Binder] FaD. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) § 83,222, at 85,141 n.2 (May 25, 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Proposal Release].
29. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text; supra note 15.
30. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,651.
31. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,140.
32. Id. at 85,141; see infra note 56.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1-.14e-3 (1983).
34. See supra note 27.
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holders ... were compelled to make important investment deci-
sions without adequate time to consider the merits of the offer and
without sufficient information upon which to base their choices. 35
In the Commission's view, however, a number of recent "trends" in
tender offer tactics have reduced the effectiveness of the investor
protection measures in regulations 14D and 14E: (1) the increased
use of partial tender offers; (2) the consequential rise in "compet-
ing partial tender offers involving a number of price increases";
and (3) the current popularity of the "'two-step' offers that com-
bine a partial cash tender offer with an offer of the securities of the
bidder, usually in a subsequent second or third step merger trans-
action.""6 Citing the recent takeover battle among Mobil Corp., Jo-
35. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,141. Senator Williams articulated his con-
cern about a "first-come, first-served" offer on the Senate floor:
If more securities are deposited pursuant to a tender than the person making the
offer is willing to buy, the securities to be bought would be required to be taken up as
nearly as possible pro rata according to the number of securities deposited by each
shareholder. This would outlaw tender offers on a first-come, first-serve basis and thus
eliminating [sic] pressure on shareholders to make hasty deposits.
113 CONG. Rac. 856 (1967).
36. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85, 141-42. In the Conoco takeover contest
Mobil Corp. had bid $90.00 per share for half of the outstanding shares of Conoco and
proposed a follow up merger in which it would exchange $90.00 in Mobile debentures or a
new preferred stock for each share of Conoco stock still outstanding. Mobil's Conoco Bid
starts moves by Justice Agency and legislators, Wall St. J., July 20, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
Messrs. James C. Freund and Edward F. Greene have described succinctly the motiva-
tion for the "multistep transaction" that often gives rise to multiple proration pools:
If the purchaser lacks sufficient funds to purchase all of the seller's shares for cash
(or, having the funds, would prefer to employ them for other purposes), or if the pur-
chaser or the seller wants the final-step merger to qualify as a tax-free reorganization
under section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code, then the number of shares to be pur-
chased pursuant to the tender offer can be limited to a stated maximum. In the final-
step merger, the seller's remaining shareholders would then receive securities of the
purchaser having a comparable value to the cash paid to the tendering shareholders.
Freund & Greene, Substance Over Form S-14: A Proposal to Reform SEC Regulation of
Negotiated Acquisitions, 36 Bus. LAw. 1483, 1503 (1981) (footnotes omitted). In addition,
they concluded that the principal advantages of the multistep transaction include: (1) the
decreased probability of a rival bid because "when the world discovers what is happening,
the purchase has often locked up a substantial block of the seller's stock"; and (2) the re-
moval or at least a reduction in the ability of shareholders to block the merger since the
bidder may own enough stock "to authorize the final-step merger single-handedly." Id. at
1504. Messrs. Freund and Greene also observed that other attractions of the multistep
merger are "improving the likelihood that the premium over market will be preserved
up to the time of the initial announcement ... and conveying the sense of moving a lot
faster... ." Id. at 1504 n.74. On the other hand, the major disadvantages of the multistep
transaction include: (1) the uncertainty that the bidder can complete the steps following the
tender offer; and (2) the inability of the bidder "to perform the extensive business and legal
review that occurs in a traditional acquisition before the purchaser is bound." Id. at 1504-
05. Other unattractive features are "that it does not lend itself so well to noncash transac-
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seph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., and E.I. DuPont de Nemours for
control of Conoco, Inc., as an example of the potential confusion
that multiple proration periods and pools engendered, 7 the SEC
relied upon section 14(e) of the Exchange Act as one alternative
for the necessary statutory authority for promulgating rule 14d-8.3 8
Despite its recognition that revised rule 14d-8 contradicts the ten
day proration period which section 14(d)(6) established 9 and that
Congress expressly rejected proposals extending the proration pe-
riod over the life of a tender offer when it considered the Williams
Act,40 the SEC interpreted the broad rulemaking provision of sec-
tion 14(e) as congressional recognition that "the Commission
needed full rulemaking authority to deal more effectively with
tender offer practices that had the potential to injure investors as
these practices developed." 41
tions at the block purchase and tender offer stages and that it may be more prone to litiga-
tion at the final cash merger .... "Id. at 1505 n.76. Seagram apparently discovered another
disadvantage of a bidding contest through partial tender offers: at the conclusion of the
Conoco fight, Seagram ended up with 28 million shares of Conoco which it exchanged for
47.6 million shares or 20% of DuPont. Seagram Co. to Swap Conoco Stake for 20% of
Merged Company, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1981, at 39, col. 3. See also, Lewis, Securities Law
Aspects of Multistep Cash-Election Mergers, 10 INST. ON SEC. REG. 395, 396 (1979) (Acqui-
sition-minded companies find it "highly desirable to integrate the tender offer and the
merger in order to nail down the transaction as quickly as possible.").
37. The takeover battle among Mobil, DuPont, and Seagram for control of Conoco
during the summer of 1981 confronted the shareholders of Conoco with a myriad of offers
and counteroffers. For a chronological summary of the events, see The Bidding for Conoco,
Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1981, at 8, col. 2. In a footnote to its Proposal Release, the Commission
summarized the complexity of the varying proration and withdrawal periods that developed
from the large number of partial tender offers and price increases that characterized the
Conoco battle. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,144 n.17.
38. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,652.
39. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,142; see supra notes 27-30 and accompany-
ing text.
40. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,142; see infra notes 113-34 and accompany-
ing text.
41. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,142 (footnote omitted). In Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv. Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld the author-
ity of the Federal Reserve Board under the Truth in Lending Act to define the situations
that trigger certain disclosure provisions of the Act. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion
appears to describe the broad rulemaking authority that the SEC would advocate in support
of revised rule 14d-8:
The hearings held by Congress reflect the difficulty of the task it sought to accom-
plish. Whatever legislation was passed had to deal not only with the myriad forms in
which credit transaction then occurred, but also with those which would be devised in
the future. To accomplish its desired objective, Congress determined to lay the struc-
ture of the Act broadly and to entrust its construction to an agency with the necessary
experience and resources to monitor its operation.
Id. at 365 (footnote omitted).
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The SEC maintained that the ten day statutory proration re-
quirement was insufficient to assure that the target shareholders
would receive their materials and have time to make an informed
decision. Therefore, the statutory proration period presented the
possibility that some security holders would not receive even those
"tender offer materials sent first class on the first day of a tender
offer until after the.., proration period has expired. 42 The Com-
mission also noted that most unsophisticated investors may not
possess the investigative resources available to institutional inves-
tors who often can dispatch special messengers to retrieve tender
offer materials at the earliest possible moment.43 In addition, the
SEC commented that a shareholder in an "any and all" tender of-
fer has twenty days to make his investment decision while a share-
holder considering a partial tender offer effectively has only ten
days to accept or reject the offer or risk losing acceptance of his
shares on a pro rata basis.44
The Commission also expressed its concern that multiple pro-
ration pools may create confusion about the extent of a share-
holder's pro rata rights. The SEC majority specifically highlighted
the situation in which a tender offer becomes oversubscribed dur-
ing the first proration period but the bidder still increases its bid,45
presumably in response to a competing bid. The new price increase
starts a new proration period, but if the bidder also does not in-
crease the number of shares that it seeks, than "no shares tendered
42. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,143. At the time of the House hearings,
however, Mr. Phillip West, a vice president of the New York Stock Exchange and director
of the Department of Stock List, argued that the ten day period provided sufficient time for
the dissemination of information to shareholders: "With the 10-day period for the pro rata,
this is relative. We found that, by and large, it gives everyone in the United States an op-
portunity, with our rapid means of communication today, to know about the offer and make
a decision." Takeover Bids: Hearing on H.R. 14475, S.510 Before the Subcom. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Com. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
54 (1968) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Williams Act].
43. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,143. In the comment he filed on the propo-
sal to revise rule 14d-8, Professor Easterbrook argued that "'[i]f a short pro rata period
deprives [an investor] of gains in one transaction, it works to his advantage by giving him a
disproportionately large share of gains in others."' DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, SECURI-
TIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, SUMMARY OF COMMENTS, FInz No. S7-933, at 9 (quoting Letter of
Comment from Professor Frank H. Easterbrook) [hereinafter cited as DIVISION OF CoaPo-
PATE FINANcE].
44. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,144. Under the SEC's rules, a competing
bidder merely may publish a notice that invites interested shareholders to request the
materials relating to the tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(a)(2) (1983).
45. Proposal Pelease, supra note 28, at 85,145.
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into the second proration pool will be accepted for purchases.""6
Thus, as a result of the confusion that multiple proration pools
engender, a shareholder who tenders into the second pool rather
than selling on the open market could realize no benefits from the
tender offer.
B. Chairman Shad's Dissent
While concentrating on the merits of revised rule 14d-8 and
noting his agreement with Commissioner Treadway's dissent,47
Chairman Shad stated in his dissenting opinion that the SEC's au-
thority to promulgate the rule "is not clear."48 Furthermore, Chair-
man Shad observed that Congress had "considered and explicitly
rejected the proration scheme the new Rule 14d-8 implements." '49
The chairman also contended that the SEC, by extending the pro-
ration period beyond the expiration of the withdrawal period,50 has
increased the "proration uncertainty" for target shareholders be-
cause they must decide on tendering or withdrawing their shares
during the withdrawal period without knowing the total number of
shares that target shareholders have tendered for pro rata accept-
ance.51 He further argued that the additional week which must
46. Id.
47. Commissioner Treadway concentrated on the absence of sufficient rulemaking au-
thority for the SEC to adopt revised rule 14d-8. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
48. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,652 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting).
49. Id. (Shad, Chairman, dissenting) (footnote omitted). The Senate Report men-
tioned that the ten day limitation on the period for pro rata acceptance was an addition to
the original bill:
The bill as introduced would also have required that all shares deposited during
the tender offer be taken up on a pro rata basis if less than all of the deposited shares
were purchased. During the hearings representatives of the New York Stock Exchange
testified as to their experience with an exchange policy which requires pro rata accept-
ance of shares offered for the first 10 days of the offer and suggested an additional 10-
day period in case of an increase in price. In view of the experience of the New York
Stock Exchange, your committee believes that the pro rata period can be so limited
and has amended the bill accordingly.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT ON
WLLIAMS AcT] cited in Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,652 n.1 (Shad, Chairman,
dissenting). See infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
50. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,653 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting).
51. Id. (Shad, Chairman, dissenting). Chairman Shad complained that because share-
holders now "must wait 26-28 calendar days to learn the proration, . . . the withdrawal
period expires five business days before shareholders know the proration." Id. (Shad, Chair-
man, dissenting) (emphasis in original). Thus, he concluded that the extension of the prora-
tion period effectively "nullifies the benefit of the withdrawal period to shareholder." Id.
(Shad, Chairman, dissenting).
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pass before the bidder may purchase the tendered shares increases
the danger that "target defensive tactics, 'white knight' and com-
petitive bidders" could increase the cost of the takeover or foil the
bid altogether.2
In his comments on the merits of revised rule 14d-8, Chairman
Shad concentrated on the relationship between the withdrawal and
new proration periods5 3 and maintained that they would form a
trap for the unwary and "[u]nsophisticated" shareholder who
would tender early and then become "locked-in upon expiration of
the withdrawal period." Echoing some of the concerns that the
SEC expressed in the release proposing revised rule 14d-8,55 Chair-
man Shad warned that the rule will facilitate and enhance the ef-
fectiveness of "dilatory tactics by target companies," "multiple
tenders and proration pools," "'golden parachutes,'" or "two-tier
offers or legal and financial maneuvers by bidder and target com-
panies."' In light of this consequence, he concluded that revised
52. Id. (Shad, Chairman, dissenting). During the Conoco takeover battle, the Wall
Street Journal reported that Seagram filed suit alleging "that at a June 29 meeting, Conoco
directors weighed certain possible transactions, among them acquisition of Conoco by an-
other company, public or private sales of Conoco stock and the 'complete or partial liquida-
tion' of Conoco." Seagram Sues Conoco, Accusing Directors of 'Drastic,' Illegal Defense
Measures, Wall St. J., July 6, 1981, at 6, col. 3.
53. See supra note 51.
54. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,653 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting).
55. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In the release proposing revisions to
rule 14d-8, the SEC demonstrated its awareness of the current criticism of the tender offer
regulatory structure. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,145. The Commission observed
that these critics argue that federal regulation increases "risks and costs to the first bidder"
and, therefore, has these consequences: (1)"security holders... may have lost opportunities
to receive any premiums"; and (2)"some firms may be operated less efficiently than they
could be." The Commission concluded by announcing that it "intends to evaluate the entire
regulatory scheme applicable to tender offers, including these economic issues." Id.
56. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,653 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting). In Dono-
van v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.9 (2d Cir. 1982), the court stated that the "press
currently recounts how high corporate executives are equipping themselves with 'golden
parachutes' providing large benefits in the event that the executive is dismissed or even if he
quits on his own volition after a takeover."
In his comment on revised rule 14d-8, Professor Easterbrook asserted that the rule
change "would 'cause shareholders as a group to be worse off, because [it would] reduce the
effectiveness of the tender offer process in generating gains shareholders value [sic].'" Drv-
SION or CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 43, at 28 (quoting Letter of Comment from Profes-
sor Frank H. Easterbrook). Furthermore, he apparently maintained that "the proposal
might deter potential bidders from making offers." Id. at 26. If revised rule 14d-8 does in-
crease the frequency of defensive tactics by the management of target companies, Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel recently have presented one view of the possible effects. Writing
before the SEC proposed its revisions in rule 14d-8, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel
maintained that "current legal rules allowing the target's management to engage in defen-
sive tactics in response to a tender offer decrease shareholders' welfare." Easterbrook &
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Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
H~av. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Responding to a Tender Offer].
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel started with the premise that the value of a share of
stock is the combination of two elements: "the price that will prevail in the market if there
is no successful offer (multiplied by the likelihood that there will be none) and the price
that will be paid in a future tender offer (multiplied by the likelihood that some offers will
succeed)." Id. In addition, they have contended that "[t]he most probable explanation for
unfriendly takeovers emphasizes their role in monitoring the performance of corporate man-
agers." Id. at 1169. Thus, a policy that promotes the use of defensive tactics harms share-
holders in two ways: first, the absence of a meaningful takeover threat reduces the value of
the shareholder's investment in the market; and second, the shareholders lose the benefits
accruing to them from the oversight of management that the threat of a hostile tender offer
provides. In their view, a "defensive strategy" that does not consider these two concerns
"ignores much that is relevant to shareholders' welfare." Id. at 1164. Furthermore, Profes-
sors Easterbrook and Fischel believe that "because the process of resistance consumes real
resources, shareholders as a whole lose by the amount targets spend in resistance plus the
amount bidders and any rivals spend in overcoming resistance. These additional costs can
be substantial." Id. at 1175 (footnotes omitted). The additional costs acquire significance for
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel in their evaluation of defensive tactics that allow or
provoke an "auction" for the stock of the target corporation between two or more bidders.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36
Bus. LAw. .1733, 1737-38 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Takeover Bids]. Since the use of defen-
sive tactics will increase the costs of mounting a hostile tender offer, the professors believe
that fewer corporations will step forward and make the first bid. Thus, if no one makes the
first bid no auction will result and clearly "defensive tactics disserve the interests of share-
holders." Id. at 1739.
The recent commentary of Mr. Martin Lipton, who has defended the application of the
business judgment rule to the decision of the targets directors to fight a takeover bid, Lip-
ton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 124, 131 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Target's Boardroom], articulates a different view of the effects of the tender
offer on shareholder welfare. In fact, Mr. Lipton and Professors Easterbrook and Fischel
have engaged in a rather active debate. Compare Takeover Bids, supra, at 1739 ("We think
Lipton has erred in this theoretical argument and has either ignored or misunderstood the
relevant evidence.") with Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1980) ("Absent clear
evidence, or broad acceptance of the accuracy of the economic propositions on which they
predicate their argument, no basis exists for the dramatic change in the law for which
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue.") Based on the empirical data he assembled, Mr.
Lipton concluded:
Experience shows that from the standpoint of whether the shareholders win or lose, the
decision to accept or reject is about 50/50 on market price alone and, if sale value today
as opposed to yesterday's rejected offer price is used as the basis of comparison, the
shareholders have profited in the overwhelming majority of defeated takeovers.
Target's Boardroom, supra, at 108-09. Because his empirical data indicates that the accept-
ance of a takeover bid is not always beneficial for shareholder welfare, id. at 106-07, Mr.
Lipton has maintained that the business judgment rule should protect the target directors'
"reasonable good-faith decision to reject the takeover," id. at 124, on one or more of the
grounds he outlined, which were "inadequate price," "wrong time to sell," "illegality," "ad-
verse impact on constituencies other than the shareholders," "risk of nonconsummation,"
"failure to provide equally for all shareholders," and "doubt as to quality of the raider's
securities in an exchange offer." Id. at 122-23.
In addition, Mr. Lucian Bebchuk has articulated four motives for making a tender offer
(1) the bidder believes it can increase the profits of the target by replacing target manage-
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rule 14d-8 will "compound unsophisticated investors' confusion""
rather than promote the SEC's stated purpose of alleviating inves-
tor confusion.5 8 The chairman also argued that the increased risk
of "blocking legal actions by the parties involved in the tender of-
fer will depress the market price for nontendering or withdrawing
shareholders."59 Moreover, the Chairman worried about the sub-
stantial possibility that fewer tender offers would occur after the
first party entered its bid.60
C. Commissioner Treadway's Dissent
Contrasting sections 14(d)(5) and 14(d)(6) of the Exchange
Act, Commissioner Treadway wrote in dissent that the presence of
an express authorization for the SEC to alter the withdrawal pe-
riod of the former demonstrates the importance of the absence of
such a provision from the latter.61 From this comparison Commis-
ment; (2) synergistic gains from the combination of the bidder and the target; (3) the stock
of the target is undervalued; and (4) the management of the bidder may be seeking to maxi-
mize growth. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 1028, 1030-33 (1982). Furthermore, he advocates "a rule of auctioneering that: (1) pro-
vides, by regulating offerors, time for making competing bids; and (2) allows incumbent
management to solicit such bids by providing information about the target to potential buy-
ers." Id. at 1030. Mr. Bebchuk has observed that "[tihe threat of a subsequent freezeout
may... pressure shareholders to tender their shares for the premium offered, even if the
premium is one they would likely reject were they able to organize." Id. at 1040 (footnotes
omitted). Because his auctioneering rule requires competing bidders if the target sharehold-
ers are to realize the advantages of the rule, he supports regulation extending the period
after a bidder announces an offer and before it purchases the shares. Id. at 1051-54. At the
same time, however, he has advocated a prohibition on "obstructing tactics" from the man-
agement of the target. Id. at 1053.
57. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,653 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting).
58. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
59. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,653 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting). Under
the analysis of Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, a lower market price and a decreasing
likelihood that a tender offer would succeed combine to impact negatively on the welfare of
the shareholders of a potential target. See supra note 56.
60. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,654 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting). Profes-
sors Easterbrook and Fischel also have argued that one of the primary beneficial results of
the hostile tender offer is the "monitoring" effect on corporate management that the threat
provides:
[S]hareholders benefit even if their corporation never is the subject of a tender offer.
The process of monitoring by outsiders poses a continuous threat of takeover if per-
formance lags. Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs in order to reduce the
chance of takeover, and the process of reducing agency costs leads to higher prices for
shares.
Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 56, at 1174 (footnote omitted).
61. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,654 (Treadway, Comm'r, dissenting). Sec-
tion 14(d)(5) provides as follows:
Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders
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sioner Treadway concluded that "Congress is quite capable of
clearly granting us authority to modify expressly stated time
frames when that is the intent of Congress." 2 Although the SEC
relied upon section 14(e) of the Exchange Act as one source of its
authority to promulgate revised rule 14d-8,6 3 the commissioner ob-
served that the legislative history of the 1970 amendments to the
Williams Act, which added the rulemaking authority that section
14(e) establishes, failed to articulate the relationship between sec-
tions 14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act." Furthermore, he con-
cluded that the SEC's reliance on section 14(e) would require "a
determination that compliance with the express 10 day period of
Section 14(d)(6) either is, or is at least closely akin to, 'fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative' activity. 6 5 In light of the significant
difference of opinion on the Commission concerning the promulga-
tion of rule 14d-8, this Recent Development next focuses upon two
recent federal court decisions that deal directly with the legality of
multiple proration pools under sections 14(d) and 14(e) and the
SEC's rulemaking authority under section 14(e).
III. RECENT JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
A. Jacobs v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.: The Validity of
Multiple Proration Pools
Two weeks before the SEC promulgated revised rule 14d-8,
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware con-
sidered the case of Jacobs v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,"s in which
the target corporation Pabst Brewing Co. challenged the use of
multiple partial tender offers by a group of Pabst shareholders on
the ground that such a practice "unjustifiably discriminate[d]"
against the other Pabst shareholders.6 7 The JMSL Acquiring Corp.
may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until the expiration of
seven days after the time definitive copies of the offer or request or invitation are first
published or sent or given to security holders, and at any time after sixty days from the
date of the original tender offer or request or invitation, except as the Commission
may otherwise prescribe by rules, regulations, or order as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
62. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,654 (Treadway, Comm'r, dissenting).
63. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
64. Adoption Release, supra note 10, at 85,654 (Treadway, Comm'r, dissenting).
65. Id. (Treadway, Comm'r, dissenting).
66. 551 F. Supp. 639 (D. Del. 1982).
67. Id. at 642.
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(JMSL), an instrumentality of the bidding group of shareholders,68
commenced a partial tender offer for 3,000,000 shares of Pabst
common stock at $24.00 per share on October 27, 1982, and pro-
vided for the ten day statutory proration period which expired on
November 5, 1982.69 A takeover battle developed, however, when
HBC Acquisition, Inc. (HBC), a subsidiary of Heileman, made a
partial tender offer for seventy-three percent of Pabst common
stock at $25.00 per share.7 0 As a result of the HBC offer, JMSL
extended the withdrawal date for the tendering shareholders of
Pabst for ten additional days to November 26, 1982.71 JMSL then
announced two increases in its bid price, the latter of which oc-
curred November 23, 1982. JMSL, however, retained the Novem-
ber 26, 1982, withdrawal deadline.7 2
Although the expiration date for the new proration period for
tendering Pabst shareholders became December 2, 1982 after the
November 23 price increase, JMSL announced that it first would
purchase on a pro rata basis those shares that Pabst shareholders
tendered but did not withdraw prior to the first increase in the bid
price on November 18, 1982.7s Thus, JMSL established two prora-
tion pools with those Pabst shareholders who tendered before the
price increase in the first pool and those who tendered their shares
after the increase in the second. Pabst asked the court in Jacobs to
enjoin any purchases by JMSL until JMSL altered the terms of its
tender offer to provide for one proration period extending from
October 27 until ten days following the issuance of such an injunc-
tion and an extension of the withdrawal period until at least fifteen
68. JMSL is a subsidiary of PST Acquiring Corp., of which the bidding Pabst share-
holders owned 100% of the outstanding shares. Id. at 641 n.1.
69. Id. at 641. The court observed that the 3,000,000 shares sought were "approxi-
mately 37% of the outstanding shares" of Pabst. Id.
70. Id. Although Pabst shareholders had tendered 5,340,000 shares by the deadline for
pro rata acceptance, they had until November 17, 1982, to withdraw their shares, id., pursu-
ant to rule 14d-7(a), which provides in part:
In addition to the provisions of section 14(d)(5) of the Act, any person who has depos-
ited securities pursuant to a tender offer has the right to withdraw any such securities
during the following periods:
(1) At any time until the expiration of fifteen business days from the date of com-
mencement of such tender offer; ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1983).
71. Jacobs v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 551 F. Supp. at 642.
72. Id. Rule 14d-7, which measures the withdrawal period from the "date of com-
mencement," does not require a new 15 day withdrawal period when a bidder increases its
price.
73. Jacobs v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 551 F.Supp. at 642.
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days after the court's order.74 Relying upon the release proposing
revised rule 14d-8,75 Pabst claimed that the use of these "multiple
proration pools" "will 'be perverted into a device for egregious dis-
crimination among shareholders.' "781 Despite Pabst's claim that
the court should adopt the SEC's rationale and determine that
JMSL's "abusive and manipulative practices 7 7 violated sections
14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act,78 the Jacobs court relied
upon provisions in the legislative history of section 14(d)(6) that
expressly contemplate the "use of multiple proration pools. '7' The
Court's reasoning indicates its determination that the use of multi-
ple proration pools in itself did not violate section 14(e).80
B. Canadian Pacific Enterprises (U.S.) Inc. v. Krouse: The
Rulemaking Reach of the SEC
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Ohio also recently considered the extent of the SEC's rulemaking
authority under the Williams Act in Canadian Pacific Enterprises
(U.S.) Inc. v. Krouse.81 Plaintiffs in Krouse had announced a cash
tender offer for the shares of a target corporation with its principal
place of business in Ohio.82 Under the terms of rule 14d-2(b) 8
74. Id.
75. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
76. Jacobs v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 551 F. Supp. at 642 (quoting Docket Item 10,
at 13).
77. 551 F. Supp. at 643. By relying upon § 14(e) for the authority to promulgate re-
vised rule 14d-8, the SEC apparently maintains that multiple proration pools constitute a
practice that is "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." See supra note 65 and accompany-
ing text; infra text accompanying note 168.
78. Jacobs v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 551 F. Supp. at 644.
79. Id. at 643-44. The court quoted the following excerpt from the Senate Report on
the Williams Act-
Proposed section 14(d)(6) would provide that where a greater number of securities
are deposited within the first 10 days after a tender offer is made public than the per-
son making that tender offer is bound or willing to take up, the securities deposited
must be taken up pro rata according to the number of securities deposited by each
depositor. If the person making the tender offer increases the consideration, a new 10-
day pro rat period would be required allowing all shareholders a fair opportunity to
participate in the offer. In the event that the consideration is increased, all shares de-
posited before the increase would be required to be taken up before any shares depos-
ited thereafter, unless all shares deposited pursuant to the tender offer were taken up
on a pro rata basis.
SENATE REPORT ON WLiA1ms ACT, supra note 49, at 10, quoted in Jacobs v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 551 F. Supp. at 644.
80. See supra note 77; infra text accompanying note 168.
81. 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
82. Id. at 1193.
83. Rule 14d-2(b) provides:
1328
1983] RULEMAKING UNDER SECTION 14(e) 1329
under the Exchange Act, plaintiffs had to commence the tender
offer within five days after they publicly announced it.8 4 The Ohio
Legislature, however, had enacted a law that prevented an offeror
from commencing a tender offer within twenty days of the same
public announcement.8 5 In light of the irreconcilable conflict be-
tween rule 14d-2(b) and the Ohio statute, plaintiffs in Krouse
sought a declaratory judgment that the SEC rule was valid and
preempted Ohio law.$6 Although the district court concluded that
the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 87 did not nec-
essarily control the disposition of plaintiffs' challenge, the court
adopted the standards that the Act provides8 to determine
whether, as defendants claimed, the SEC acted in excess of its au-
thority and in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 89
A public announcement by a bidder through a press release, newspaper advertisement
or public statement which includes the information in paragraph (c) of this section
with respect to a tender offer in which the consideration consists solely of cash and/or
securities exempt from registration under section 3 of the Securities Act of 1933 shall
be deemed to constitute the commencement of a tender offer under paragraph (a)(5) of
this section Except, That such tender offer shall not be deemed to be first published or
sent or given to security holders by the bidder under paragraph (a)(5) of this section on
the date of such public announcement if within five business days of such public an-
nouncement, the bidder either.
(1)Makes a subsequent public announcement stating that the bidder has deter-
mined not to continue with such tender offer, in which event paragraph (a)(5) of this
section shall not apply to the initial public announcement; or
(2)Complies with Rule 14d-3(a) (§ 240.14d-3(a)) and contemporaneously dissemi-
nates the disclosure required by Rule 14d-6 (§ 240.14d-6) to security holders pursuant
to Rule 14d-4 (§ 240.14d-4) or otherwise in which events:
(i)The date of commencement of such tender offer under paragraph (a) of this
section will be determined by the date the information required by Rule 14d-6 is
first published or sent or given to security holders pursuant to Rule 14d-4 or oth-
erwise; and
(ii)Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, section 14(d)(7) of the
Act shall be deemed to apply to such tender offer from the date of such public
announcement.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1983).
84. Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1193-94.
85. The Ohio statute provides in part: "No offeror shall make a take-over bid unless at
least twenty days prior thereto he announces publicly the terms of the proposed takeover
bid and files with the division of securities and the target company copies of all information
required by division (B)(3) of this section .... ." OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1)
(Supp. 1982).
86. Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1193, 1194.
87. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
88. 506 F. Supp. at 1197-98.
89. Id. at 1198. Section 25(b)(4), which establishes the standard for judicial review of
the Commission's rules, provides:
(4) The findings of the Commission as to the facts identified by the Commission as
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First, the court addressed defendants' assertion that the SEC
exceeded its authority by including a definition of the concept of
"commencement" in rule 14d-2.90 The Krouse court observed that
the SEC merely utilized the concept of "commencement" "to de-
fine, summarize, and interpret the statutory phrase 'first published
or sent or given to security holders'" that exists in section
14(d)(1).9 1 In addition to finding that the Commission had acted
consistently with the Exchange Act by merely defining a "techni-
cal" term,92 the court also noted that Congress, in 1975, had ex-
panded the definitional authority of the SEC to include "other
terms. '9 3 Thus, the court sustained rule 14d-2 as a permissible ac-
the basis, in whole or in part, of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. The court shall affirm and enforce the rule unless the Commission's action
in promulgating the rule is found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right; or without observance of procedure required by law.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 25(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(4) (1976).
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the United
States Supreme Court analyzed whether an agency's action was "'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law'" under Administrative Proce-
dure Act § 706(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). 401 U.S. at 416. Although the "ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one," id., the Court determined that a reviewing court must
consider "relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgement." Id. In
light of Overton Park, the Krouse court adopted a three part inquiry under which to evalu-
ate new rule 14d-2: "(1) What factors are relevant to challenged rulemaking? (2) Did the
SEC consider these factors? (3) Did the SEC expressly and rationally relate the factors to
the rule it promulgated?" Canadian Pac. Enter. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1201 (footnote
omitted). After concluding that the SEC had demonstrated its concern with relevant factors,
such as investor protection, "restoration of neutrality between offerors and target manage-
ment and stabilization of the function of secondary securities markets," by considering these
factors in several releases, id. at 1201-02, the Krouse court determined that the SEC had
established a "rational relationship" between the challenged rule and the achievement of
the SEC's articulated objectives. Id. at 1202-03.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has expressed
concern that the Supreme Court's use of the phrase "clear error of judgment" may confuse
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review with the "clearly erroneous" requirement
under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 34-35 n.74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Envirnonmental Protection Agency, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). Under rule 52(a)
an appellate court "fairly readily" may reverse the findings of fact by a trial judge who sat
without a jury. 541 F.2d at 35 n.74. Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded
that the Supreme Court in Overton Park did not "sanction review more intrusive than
traditional 'arbitrary and capricious' review; rather, the Court has reaffirmed that the re-
viewing court must defer if the agency has a rational basis for its decision." Id.
90. See supra note 83.
91. Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1199.
92. Id.
93. Id.
1330
RULEMAKING UNDER SECTION 14(e)
tion by the Commission to define the phrase "first published or
sent or given to security holders." 4
Second, defendants contended that the adoption of rule 14d-2
exceeded the SEC's rulemaking authority under section 23(a) of
the Exchange Act,95 which provides that the Commission may
adopt rules and regulations "necessary or appropriate to imple-
ment the provisions of this chapter for which [the SEC is] respon-
sible or for the execution of the functions vested in [the SEC] by
this chapter." 96 Although defendants argued that rule 14d-2 was
not "necessary or appropriate" because it was merely an effort to
preempt state law for the sake of preemption," the court con-
cluded that no provision of the securities laws would invalidate an
action of the Commission on that basis. 98 Furthermore, the court
advanced its position on the definitional character of the rule by
determining that "'commencement' constitutes a definition, not a
new term itself defined."99 The Krouse court concluded that "[tihe
'functions' of the SEC are not boundless, but they are nevertheless
very broad in service of investor protection and the public
interest."100
Third, the court concluded that section 14(d)(4) "gives the
SEC plenary power to regulate the conduct of all who solicit ac-
ceptances or rejections of tender offers .... ,101 Defendants main-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1976). In Touche
Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit considered a challenge to
the authority of the SEC to promulgate rule 2(e) of the Commission's rules of practice. The
SEC had relied upon section 23(a)(1) of the Exchange Act as its statutory authorization to
adopt the rule. Id. at 577-78; see supra note 15. In other challenges to an agency's rulemak-
ing authority, the Second Circuit observed that "the Supreme Court has held that, if the
regulation is in furtherance of a legitimate statutory purpose, the validity of the regulation
will be upheld." 609 F.2d at 579. Because "Congress realized that it could not enact express
statutory provisions to deal with every possible evil that might develop," id. at 580, the
Touche Ross court sustained the rule as "an attempt by the Commission to protect the
integrity of its own processes." Id. at 582.
97. Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1199.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added). When it considered the rulemaking authority that section
10(b) of the Exchange Act granted the Commission, the Supreme Court observed, "The
rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency ... is not the power to make law.
Rather, it is "'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as
expressed by the statute.' " Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1975)
(quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965) (quoting Manhattan General Equip-
ment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936))), quoted in Canadian Pac. Enter.
1983] 1331
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1313
tained that the legislative history of the Williams Act indicates
that Congress intended section 14(d)(4) to apply only to existing
tender offers, 102 but the court refused to adopt this construction.103
In fact, the court concluded that such a narrow reading "would
contradict the plain meaning of the statutory text."" 4
Last, the court concluded that section 14(e) of the Exchange
Act10 5 "contribute[d]" to the SEC's authority to promulgate rule
14d-2. Defendants "disingenously" claimed they were unable to lo-
cate a "'fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative"' action within the
meaning of section 14(e).10 6 The court, however, determined that
"considerable potential for manipulation" exists "if an offer is pub-
(U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192, 1198 (S.D. Ohio 1981). The federal courts, in cases they
decided under the securities laws prior to enactment of the Williams Act, had recognized
the broad rulemaking authority of the Commission. E.g., Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC,
360 F.2d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 1966) ("The Securities and Exchange Commission has broad
authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary for the execution of its functions.") (re-
jecting petitioners' challenge to SEC refusal to allow purchase of transcripts from nonpublic
investigation in which petitioners testified); R. A. Holnan & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 132
(D.C. Cir. 1962) ("In all the statutes under which the Securities and Exchange Commission
operates, Congress has given it broad rulemaking powers .... In view of the nature of the
subject matter, the grant of such powers was imperative, to protect investors against fraud
or deception made possible by constantly changing conditions.") (sustaining SEC suspen-
sion of the availability of Regulation A exemption for stock underwritten by plaintiff bro-
ker-dealer), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
102. Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1200. Section 14(d)(4) of
the Exchange Act provides as follows:
Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security to accept or reject
a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders shall be made in accordance with
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1976).
103. Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1200. The legislative his-
tory of § 14(d)(4) does not appear to support the court's rejection of this contention in
Krouse. The House Report observes,
Proposed section 14(d)(4) would authorize the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to adopt rules and regulations with respect to solicitations or recommendations to
accept or reject tender offers or requests or invitations for tenders. Under this provi-
sion the Securities and Exchange Commission could specify the information to be in-
cluded in any recommendation by management or others in favor of or in opposition to
a tender offer and could regulate the solicitation of investors by brokers and dealers
who are often compensated for shares tendered as a result of their activities. It would
also enable the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate the activities of per-
sons who make competing tender offers or seek to influence the investor's decision on a
tender offer.
HousE REPORT ON Wn.LLuMs ACT, supra note 6, at 10, 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEws at
2820.
104. Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1200.
105. See supra note 15.
106. Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. at 1200. Defendants finally
determined that "the SEC has indicted the state tender offer statutes themselves." Id.
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licly announced, but the shareholders are not afforded the protec-
tions of the Williams Act. ' 107 Thus, the court decided that the
"subject matter of Rule 14d-2 [was] ... well within the scope of
regulatory authority conferred by Section 14(e)." 10 8
The Jacobs and Krouse courts, like the SEC in the proposal
and adoption of rule 14d-8, depended greatly upon the legislative
history of the Williams Act and the 1970 amendments. Cognizant
of the Supreme Court's warning in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus-
tries109 that "[rieliance on legislative history in divining the intent
of Congress is . . . a step to be taken cautiously," 110 this Recent
Development now examines generally the legislative history of the
Williams Act, with particular emphasis on sections 14(d)(6) and
14(e).
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WMLIAMs ACT
Advocates for and opponents of revised rule 14d-8 have relied
upon the legislative history of the Williams Act to support their
respective constructions of the SEC's rulemaking authority under
section 14(e). The SEC majority and the Krouse court emphasized
the legislative materials reflecting the general congressional pur-
pose of investor protection,1 but the dissenting members of the
Commission correctly identified other actions and statements indi-
cating a congressional preference for the ten day proration period
of section 14(d)(6).1 Nevertheless, an analysis of the SEC's ex-
pansion of its rulemaking authority through revised rule 14d-8 re-
quires a careful consideration of the legislative history of sections
14(d)(6) and 14(e), not only to determine the validity of the rule's
adoption, but also to delineate what limits exist on the Commis-
sion's rulemaking authority under section 14(e).
A. The Congressional Hearings
1. Senate Hearings
The original version of the Senate's pro rata acceptance provi-
sion of the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act placed no time
107. Id.
108. Id.; see infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
109. 430 U.S. 1 (1976).
110. Id. at 26.
111. See supra notes 31-46 & 81-108 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 49 & 61-65 and accompanying text.
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limit on the period for pro rata acceptance.11 s The Senate Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, however, amended S. 510 to estab-
lish the ten day period that eventually became part of section
14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act.1 4 In hearings before the Senate
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, the discussions encompassed not only the merits of
such a time limitation on the proration period, but also the Com-
mission's proposal that the Committee amend the pro rata accept-
ance provision of S. 510 by adding this proviso: "'except as the
Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules and regulations as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.' "-115 Thus, the hearings before the Subcommittee on
Securities are especially significant because the Subcommittee, and
eventually the entire Committee on Banking and Currency, consid-
113. Section 2(5) of S. 510 originally provided as follows:
Where any person makes a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders for less
than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater number of
securities is deposited pursuant thereto than such person is bound or willing to take up
and pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro rate,
disregarding fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by each
depositor.
Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings
Before the Subcom. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on Williams Act].
114. SENATE REPORT ON WILLuMS AcT, supra note 49, at 4-5.
115. Senate Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 113, at 38. (quoting Securities and
Exchange Commission Recommended Amendments to S. 510, 90th Congress, First Session).
The Commission also added the following explanation for its suggested change:
We have become convinced that it is not possible to anticipate all of the problems
which can arise in connection with tender offers, or to prescribe in the bill itself all the
procedures which are necessary to guarantee the equitable treatment of investors that
this legislation is intended to achieve, and which some of the comments furnished to us
by persons familiar with the techniques in tender offers and the ways of shareholders
have indicated are necessary and desirable.
Id. at 39.
Chairman Cohen of the SEC had one exchange with Senator Williams in which Chair-
man Cohen cited the Commission's proxy rules as an example of the flexibility available
through rulemaking.
Now, I do agree with what you have just said, Mr. Chairman. I think this is an area
where vesting in the Commission additional rule-making authority to provide flex-
ibility, even though it places an additional burden on us is probably in the long run the
wisest course.
You will remember, Mr. Chairman, that our proxy rules - and they are pretty
good rules as I think most people would agree - were developed from a single sentence
in section 14(a) of the statute which says, in effect, "Mr. Commissioners, go ahead and
write proper rules in the interest of investors and the public interest." That is all there
was to it.
Senate Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 113, at 191 (testimony of Mr. Manuel Cohen).
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ered and rejected a specific request for the rulemaking authority
that would support the adoption of revised rule 14d-8.116
During the course of the Subcommittee's hearings, some indi-
viduals advocated the adoption of a ten day limitation on the pe-
riod for pro rata acceptance similar to that which the New York
Stock Exchange had adopted.117 Among those persons were Mr.
Francis R. Schanck, first vice president of the Investment Bankers
Association of America, L18 Mr. Robert W. Haack, president of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,11 and representa-
tives of the New York Stock Exchange. 20 The American Stock Ex-
116. SENATE REPORT ON WILLIAMS AcT, supra note 49, at 4-5.
117. The New York Stock Exchange proposed amendment of the pro rate acceptance
provision to the following form:
Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders for less
than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater number of
securities is deposited pursuant thereto than such person is bound or willing to take up
and pay for, the securities taken up shall, for a period of ten days after copies of the
offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders, be
taken up as nearly as may be pro rate, disregarding fractions, according to the number
of securities deposited by each depositor. The provisions of this subsection shall apply
whenever there is an increase in the consideration offered security holders as de-
scribed in subsection (6). The ten day pro rata period shall commence when informa-
tion of the offer of increased consideration is first published or sent or given to secur-
ity holders.
Id. at 96 (quoting New York Stock Exchange Memorandum) (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 152. Mr. Schanck observed:
The proposed requirement that the number of securities taken up must be as
nearly as possible pro rate if a greater number of securities is deposited than the per-
son making the offer is willing to take up, would require the prorationing apply for the
entire period of the tender offer. This requirement might deter certain holders from
accepting the tender offer because those holding large blocks are often unwilling to
have their holdings split into fractions and will sell only on an all-or-nothing basis.
We suggest that subsection (5) of section 2 require that, where more securities are
offered than the person making the tender offer is willing to take up, the prorationing
requirement apply only for 10 days (during which all shareholders would have an op-
portunity to submit their shares) and that thereafter the shares may be taken up with-
out prorationing.
Id.
119. Id. at 108-09.
We support the provisions of S. 510 in connection with pro rate takeups of securi-
ties tendered, although we believe it advisable to limit the period in which the takeup
is pro rate in order to conform to existing exchange practices providing for an initial
pro rata period followed by a first-come, first-served period of takeups so that deposi-
tors will more quickly know their position in respect to the tender offer and so as to
prevent volume tenders at the close of the offering.
Id. at 108 (statement of Mr. Robert W. Haack).
120. The prepared statement of Mr. G. Keith Funston, president of the New York
Stock Exchange, outlined the justifications for a limited period for pro rate acceptance:
It seems appropriate to mention some of the reasons that make both the unlimited
pro rata and the combination pro rate, first-come first-served methods useful. The
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change, however, supported the Commission's call for rulemaking
company making a tender offer might wish to make it on a pro rata only basis in order
to have as many shares as possible on deposit pending its determination of the number
that will be purchased. On the other hand, stockholders might prefer the ten day pro
rata followed by a first-come first-served period because of the likelihood that their
shares will be on deposit a shorter time.
Some stockholders will not tender shares unless they are certain that all will be
taken because a pro rata allotment might reduce their holdings below 100 shares. Many
people do not wish to hold odd lots.
Market disruptions would also be more likely under a requirement that all tender
offers must be made on a pro rata basis. Had there been such a requirement in the past
it would have increased both the length of tender offers and the time in which large
blocks of stock would have been tied up. Withdrawing a sizable amount of a company's
outstanding securities from the market for an extended period can drastically reduce
the supply of stock available for trading. A limited supply of stock can produce abnor-
mal price fluctuations.
Senate Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 113, at 90. Mr. Donald L. Calvin, vice presi-
dent of the New York Stock Exchange, Mr. Phillip West, vice president and director of the
Department of Stock List, and Mr. Gene Meltam, executive assistant, appeared on behalf of
Mr. Funston. Id. at 69. Mr. Calvin explained that
[t]he difficulty with the pro rata method when employed for a longer period results in
part from the fact that the offeror cannot determine the percentage of shares which it
will purchase until the total number of shares tendered has been ascertained at the
expiration of the offer. With extensions, offering periods can last for several months.
This means that a person tendering his stock may not know for some time how many
of his shares-if any-will be purchased by the offeror.
Id. at 77 (testimony of Mr. Donald L. Calvin).
Messrs. West and Calvin also discussed the relationship of the 10-day proration period
that they advocated and an increase in the offer by the offeror.
MR. CALVIN. Under the amendatory language we will submit to you, the way we
have it drawn, all that is required is that there be a pro rata period for a minimum
period of 10 days. For listed companies in the New York Stock Exchange, this is the
type of thing that has been worked out on an informal basis over a period of years. I
don't know whether it would be necessary to incorporate something beyond what we
have suggested in the bill however.
SENATOR BENNETT. Even in the event of a change of price?
MR. CALVIN. Mr. West may answer that, Senator.
MR. WEST. I think it would be incumbent upon the person making the offer to
extend the period for at least 10 days after they change the price. Yes. As to incorpora-
tion in the bill, that is another consideration. I think it is essential that that be done.
SENATOR BENNETT. And the exchange would permit the extension of 10 days
under those circumstances?
MR. WEST. We would insist on it.
MR. CALVIN. Our period is a minimum period.
SENATOR BENNETT. That is a good idea.
SENATOR WILLIAMS. To go a little further - as opposed to making the pro
rata period mandatory for another 10 days when there is a price change, would you
rather give the SEC rulemaking power to extend the pro rata period after the first 10
days?
MR. CALVIN. I would prefer to reserve comment on that. We will comment on
this in the memorandum that we will submit (see p. 92). However this is not our pre-
sent position, to indicate an answer of the moment.
Senate Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 113, at 85-86. Professor Samuel L. Hayes III
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authority on the subject of pro rata acceptance." 1 After the discus-
sions on the Commission's proposal for rulemaking authority, sev-
eral proponents of the ten day limitation advised the subcommit-
tee of their opposition to the SEC's request.
1 22
of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business testified in support of the 10-day
pro rate period of the New York Stock Exchange. Extending the period for pro rate accept-
ance would "cause most investors to delay their decisions for an unnecessarily long period
and thus give the incumbent management an unfair time advantage for launching the pow-
erful counteroffensive moves which are available to it." Senate Hearings on Williams Act,
supra note 113, at 59 (testimony of Professor Samuel L. Hayes I).
121. Mr. Ralph S. Saul, president of the American Stock Exchange, stated the
following:
Balancing the various considerations, we would suggest that thought be given to
requiring pro rate treatment for a reasonable period while permitting acceptance on a
first-come, first-served basis, during the balance of the tender period or any extension,
if the terms of the tender offer so provided.
In this connection we note that Chairman Cohen of the Commission suggested a
proposed amendment to the bill which would give the Commission rulemaking power
in this area. I think it is our view, at least on taking a very cursory look at the proposed
amendment, that we would agree with this amendment of Chairman Cohen. We think
this is an area where the Commission probably would need and should have a good
deal of flexibility....
SENATOR WILIAMS. I am unclear as to just how we could prevent chaos if rulemak-
ing were allowed during these time periods. I have consummate faith in the judgment
and wisdom of the Securities and Exchange Commission and in the Chairman of the
Commission, but wouldn't there be some kind of potential chaos if different time peri-
ods were applied to different situations?
MR. SAUL. I would answer that question this way, Mr. Chairman: I think, as I
mentioned, this is an area where there may be questions which we now can't foresee
that will come up in connection with the various time periods in these tender offers.
It would seem to me that by giving the Commission rulemaking power, it gives
them the necessary flexibility to deal with these unforeseen questions....
It seems to me this is an area that the Commission, with its expertise, with its
continuing knowledge of what is going on in the market and how tender offers work,
where rulemaking power would be useful.
Senate Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 113, at 100 (statement of Mr. Ralph S. Saul).
In his prepared statement, Mr. Saul had called for "pro rate treatment for a reasonable
period while permitting acceptance on a first-come, first-served basis, during the balance of
the tender period or any extension, if the terms of the tender offer so provided." Id. at 106
(statement of Mr. Ralph S. Saul).
122. In a supplemental memorandum to the Senate Subcommittee on Securities from
Messrs. Calvin and West, the New York Stock Exchange responded to the Commission's call
for rulemaking authority regarding the length of the pro rate period:
We agree with the remarks at the hearings to the effect that to allow the Commis-
sion to promulgate rules and regulations covering this aspect of tender offers would, in
all likelihood, cause more problems than it would solve.
Most of the witnesses at the hearings endorsed the current Exchange procedures.
We believe that our practical administrative experience and concentrated studies of
tender offers are assurance that the Exchange's minimum ten day pro rate procedure is
fair to all concerned.
During our recent testimony, we were asked whether the Exchange believes there
should be an additional ten day pro rata period whenever an offeror increases the
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2. House Hearings
Initially, the structuring of the proration period in the Wil-
liams Act was the subject of disagreement between the House and
Senate versions of the bill12s as well as a topic of discussion among
witnesses testifying at congressional hearings. 12 4 At the time of the
House hearings, the House version of the Williams Act (H.R.
14475) provided for the proration of purchases by a bidder but
failed to specify a time limit.12 5 Prior to those hearings, however,
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency had amended S.
510 to adopt the ten day period that section 14(d)(6) now estab-
lishes.12 6 This difference between the two bills attracted attention
during hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Fi-
nance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Coin-
tender price. In dealing with tender offers for listed stocks, we have asked that a new
ten day pro rata period be instituted if the offering price is increased. We believe inclu-
sion of this procedure in S. 510 would be beneficial.
Senate Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 113, at 93 (quoting Memorandum to Subcom-
mittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency from Messrs. Don-
ald L. Calvin and Phillip L. West).
In comments submitted to the Subcommittee on March 22, 1967, we did object to
the first recommended amendment relating to withdrawal of tendered shares and indi-
cated our continued support of the Bill in its original form as to pro rata takeups. We
wish to reiterate these positions and to add that we do not believe sufficient informa-
tion has been furnished as to the necessity for Commission rule making authority in
respect to pro rata takeups of tendered securities.
Letter from Lloyd J. Derrickson, General Counsel, NASD, to Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.,
reprinted in Senate Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 113, at 112.
Section 2(5) provides that, where a greater number of securities is deposited pur-
suant to a tender offer than the person making the offer is bound or willing to take up
and pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro rata. The
Commission proposes that this section be changed by adding a provision "except as the
Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules and regulations as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." We believe that this pro-
posal would give unwarranted administrative authority to the Commission.
Supplementary Statement by Francis R. Schanck, first vice president, Investment Bankers
Association of America, Senate Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 113, at 164.
123. H.R. 14475 originally would have established section 14(d)(6) as follows:
Where any person makes a tender offer or request or invitation for tender for less than
all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater number of securities
is deposited pursuant thereto than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay
for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro rata, disregarding
fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by each depositor, except as
the Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules and regulations as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
H.R. 14475, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), quoted in House Hearings on Williams Act, supra
note 42, at 4.
124. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 123.
126. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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merce. 2 7 In his testimony, Donald L. Calvin, then vice president of
the New York Stock Exchange, advocated the adoption of the Sen-
ate's ten day proration period. 12 Citing what he termed the uncer-
tainty that the open-ended House pro rata period would establish,
Mr. Calvin advocated a definite limit to the proration period.12 9 In
addition, Mr. Calvin observed that a long proration period disad-
vantages the offeror and the target shareholder, because the "of-
feror cannot determine the percentage of shares which will be ac-
cepted," and the "tendering shareholder's entire holdings may be
'locked in' for months only to have a major portion returned at the
end of the pro rata period."130 He also stated "that a combination
of a 10-day pro rata period, followed by a first-come first-serve pe-
riod, is fair to all concerned. This has been the policy of the ex-
change which has stood the test of time in practical use."' s Fur-
thermore, Mr. Calvin maintained that "[w]ithdrawing a sizable
amount of a company's outstanding securities from the market for
an extended period can drastically reduce the supply of stock
available for trading. A limited supply of stock can produce abnor-
mal price fluctuations." 32
Chairman Manuel Cohen of the SEC, however, testifying in
support of the House version of what became the Williams Act,
maintained that "the House bill provides additional protections for
stockholders in this respect [pro rata acceptance] and that, in view
of the almost infinite variety in the terms of most tender offers,
which are limited only by the ingenuity of the offeror and his coun-
sel, some flexibility through rulemaking is needed."133 Foreshad-
owing the concerns that the SEC stated in its release proposing
127. See supra note 42.
128. House Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 42, at 49 (statement of Mr. Donald
L. Calvin).
129. Id. at 50 (statement of Mr. Donald L. Calvin). Mr. Calvin observed that "[t]he
SEC does have rulemaking authority in the provision in H.R. 14475, but we think that some
degree of certainty would be more desirable, like the S. 510 provision ..... Id.
130. Id. (statement of Mr. Donald L. Calvin). Chairman Cohen disputed Mr. Calvin's
contention on the "locking in" of tendered shares:
Well, if a tender can be revocable at all times it is not locked up and if the market
price adjusts, as it does, the shareholder will have a choice whether or not he wants to
wait until the end of the tender period or sell, whereas with the provision that after 10
days you are locked up there is no question about it that the offeror can keep that
stock locked up and not available to the market for as long as his underlying provision
permits him to.
Id. at 51 (testimony of Mr. Manuel Cohen).
131. Id. at 50 (statement of Mr. Donald L. Calvin).
132. Id. (testimony of Mr. Donald L. Calvin).
133. Id. at 18 (testimony of Mr. Manuel Cohen).
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revised rule 14d-8, Chairman Cohen emphasized the importance of
informed decisionmaking for shareholders of a target corporation:
Information about a potential change in control can be particularly es-
sential to an informed decision. A change in control brings with it the possi-
bility of different operating results and different investment results, or per-
haps the possibility of realizing on a company's liquidation value. This may
be either good, or bad, depending on the facts and circumstances involved.
But investors and their advisers cannot reach informed conclusions on the
possible effects of a change in control until facts are available to them.
It is argued by some that the basic factor which influence [sic] share-
holder to accept a tender offer is the adequacy of the price. But, I might ask,
how can an investor evaluate the adequacy of the price if he cannot assess the
possible impact of a change in control? 1u
B. The Congressional Debates
1. Investor Protection and Congressional Neutrality
In light of the implications of the Williams Act and the 1970
amendments to that Act, the absence of any extensive discussion
of the legislation is unfortunate. Nevertheless, some members of
Congress did make statements relevant to a determination of con-
gressional intent. For example, when he introduced the Senate ver-
sion of the Williams Act in 1967, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr.
of New Jersey explained that "[e]very effort has been made to
avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of manage-
134. Id. at 12. During Senate hearings on the Williams Act, Chairman Cohen main-
tained that "the principal point is that we are not concerned with assisting or hurting either
side. We are concerned with the investor who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial
warfare .... The investor is lost somewhere in the shuffle." Senate Hearings on Williams
Act, supra note 113, at 178, quoted in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
One court recently reiterated that
[t]he legislative purpose behind the tender offer sections of the Williams Act "is to
provide investors who hold equity interests in public corporations, material informa-
tion with respect to the potential impact of any effort to acquire control of a company,
[and] sufficient time within which to make an unhurried investment decision as to
'whether to dispose of or retain their securities, and to assure fair treatment of the
investors.
Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Laboratories, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D. Mass. 1981) (quoting Cat-
tlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972)). See Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) ("The purpose of the Williams Act is to
insure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will
not be required to respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and
intentions of the offering party." (footnote omitted)); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.
Supp. 1206, 1216 (D.N.J. 1981) ("prime purpose of the Williams Act was to assist investors
confronted with a cash tender offer in making an informed decision"); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss &
Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 501 (W.D. Mich. 1980); MLZ, Inc. v. Fourco Glass
Co., 470 F. Supp. 273, 277 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
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ment or in favor of the offeror. ' ' 13 5 The House Report also articu-
lated the congressional intention to treat target management and
takeover bidders equally.138 At the time of the 1970 amendments,
however, Representative John S. Monagan, who introduced the
135. 113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967) (comments of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams
added:
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales equally to
protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders with-
out unduly impeding cash takeover bids .... The purpose of this bill is to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing the
offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case. Experience
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has amply
demonstrated that the disclosure requirements of the Federal securities acts are an aid
to legitimate business transactions, not a hindrance.
Id. at 855.
The following exchange between Senators Javits and Williams again concentrated on
the avowed evenhanded approach of the Williams Act:
MR. JAVITS. One other question I should like to ask the Senator. There is no
intendment in the measure, or in the fact that the measure is offered, to in any way
condemn the practice of making tenders, is there? Sometimes stockholders do very well
because of tenders, especially competitive tenders.
MR. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. There is no intention in any way to prohibit
tender offers. As a matter of fact, I think it might encourage them. Through this legis-
lation people will have more information, and will be able to intelligently decide
whether to accept a tender offer and sell their shares to a group which may wish to
obtain a controlling interest.
Id. at 24,665. Nevertheless, if Professors Easterbrook and Fischel are correct in their conclu-
sion that delaying tactics by target management increase the cost of tender offers and dis-
courage the first bidders from making the initial offer, then revised rule 14d-8 may inhibit
tender offers and the competitive situations of which the senators spoke so highly. See
supra note 56.
Later that same year, Senator Williams emphasized that disclosure must be meaningful
to effect the policies underlying the securities laws. In the specific context of the cash tender
offer, he stated:
By use of a cash tender offer the person seeking control can operate in almost
complete secrecy. He need not state the source of his funds; who his associates are; why
he wants to acquire control of the corporation; and what he intends to do with it if he
gains control.
Today, the public shareholder in deciding whether to reject or accept a tender
offer possesses limited information. No matter what he does, he acts without adequate
knowledge to enable him to decide rationally what is the best course of action. This is
precisely the dilemma which our securities laws are designed to prevent.
113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967). See also Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191, 193 (D.
Nev. 1981) ("Congress sought to strike a neutral balance between the offeror and the target
management.").
136. The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management
or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is designed to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and
management equal opportunity to fully present their case.
HousE REPORT ON WE.LA.ms ACT, supra note 6, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811, 2813.
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House version of the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act, did
not profess that same policy of neutrality: "I introduced H.R. 4285
because I was seriously concerned with the defenseless position of
shareholders and management of target companies in a cash take-
over bid. '137 The SEC indicated its agreement with Representative
Monagan by stating in a memorandum to the committee that the
rulemaking authority of the SEC under section 14(e) "would en-
able the Commission to deal more effectively with the devices
sometimes employed on both sides in contested tender offers. 13 8
On the House floor Representative Monagan added that the securi-
ties laws prior to the 1970 amendments did not provide sufficient
time for "management to present a defense to the takeover," but
he nevertheless insisted that while he
appreciated the necessity for the SEC to maintain a posture that favors
neither the person making the cash tender offer nor the target company, I did
not believe that that objective could be achieved under existing law. As the
situation stood the moving party had all of the advantages and frequently
utilized the element of surprise to the detriment of shareholders and manage-
ment of the target company .... I did not introduce my bill to shift the
advantages from the person making the cash takeover offer to the manage-
ment or to put shareholders in a position to exploit the market impact of a
tender offer. I did introduce the bill as a means to balance the equities be-
tween the competing parties to prevent unnecessary economic dislocations of
particular industries which are frequently occasioned by the looseness of our
present laws governing cash takeover bids.13 9
2. SEC Rulemaking Under Section 14(e)
When he introduced the Senate version of the 1970 amend-
ments to the Williams Act, Senator Williams observed that the ex-
tension of rulemaking authority to the SEC under section 14(e)
is of the utmost necessity. The techniques used in corporate takeovers and
tender offers have become increasingly sophisticated and change rapidly.
This is particularly true in situations where the takeover it resisted by incum-
bent management - industrial warfare develops. Claims and counterclaims,
charges and countercharges are hurled back and forth. Efforts are often made
to influence the price of the securities involved. The Commission must be
given full rulemaking powers in order to deal with these rapidly changing
problems.""
137. Investor Protection in Corporate Takeovers; Increase in 'Regulation A' Exemp-
tion: Hearing on H.R. 4285, S. 3431, and S. 336 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1970) (comments of Rep. Monagan) (emphasis added).
138. Id. (Memorandum of Securities Exchange Commission submitted by Chairman
Homer H. Budge).
139. 116 CoNG. REc. 40,188 (1970) (comments of Rep. Monagan).
140. Id. at 3024 (comments of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams explained the
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Likewise, Representative William L. Springer expressed confidence
and comfort in the rulemaking of the SEC when he spoke to the
House:
To meet these two problems the committee says that the SEC rules must
be for the purpose of first defining fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative
practices; and, second, prescribing means to prevent those manipulative prac-
tices. As long as the Commission has that power to force disclosure and sec-
ondly to be able to define what manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent prac-
tices are, then I believe we are safe in this field.
141
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, Mr. Homer H. Budge,
Chairman of the SEC, produced a memorandum that the Division
of Corporation Finance prepared which outlined seven problem ar-
eas with which the SEC could deal under its then-proposed
rulemaking authority in section 14(e). While these problem areas
concern the timeliness and extent of disclosure, no single area in-
cludes the prospect of the SEC's alteration of congressionally im-
posed requirements in response to changing tender offer
practice. 14 2
rulemaking provisions of the Williams Act in the following manner when he introduced the
Senate bill:
Additionally, the Commission would be given rulemaking power with respect to
solicitations or recommendations to the holders of a security to either accept or reject a
tender offer. In the rather common situation where existing management or third par-
ties contest a tender offer, shareholders may be exposed to a bewildering variety of
conflicting appeals and arguments designed to persuade them either to accept or to
reject the tender offer. The experience of the SEC with proxy fights offers ample evi-
dence that this type of situation can best be controlled, and shareholders most ade-
quately informed, if both sides to the argument are subject to the full and fair disclos-
ure rules of the Federal securities laws.
113 CONG. REc. 855-56 (1967).
141. 114 CONG. REc. 21,483 (1968) (comments of Rep. Springer).
142. MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY DIVISION OF CORPORATION
FINANCE
A. PROBLEM AREAS WHICH MAY BE DEALT WITH BY RULE-MAKING
AUTHORITY PROPOSED IN SECTION 4 OF S. 3431 WHICH WOULD AMEND
SECTION 14(e) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934.
1. The person who makes a tender offer may fail (a) to pay for securities pur-
chased, or (b) to return to their owners securities not purchased, promptly upon the
termination of the tender offer in accordance with the practices of the financial com-
munity for settlement of transactions, usually within five days.
2. The person who makes a tender offer may not have in hand the funds to pay for
the securities he offers to purchase (or reasonable additional amounts which he
reserves discretion to purchase) or a legally enforceable commitment to borrow such
funds from [a] responsible person.
3. The person making a tender bid may fail to make an appropriate announcement
or to withdraw such bid promptly after the period for pro rats acceptance has expired
and the amount of securities proffered in response to the bid has reached the amount
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1313
V. ANALYSIS
Although the SEC acknowledges the controversy currently
surrounding the effects of federal regulation on tender offers, 43 the
Commission nevertheless has adopted a rule that will impact seri-
ously upon the tender offer practice. In one sense this action
merely represents the Commission's articulated concern that the
old proration rule disadvantaged shareholders of a target corpora-
tion. 4 While the adoption of rule 14d-8 also reflects the SEC's
belief in the breadth of its rulemaking authority, the history of the
Williams Act indicates that Congress considered and rejected the
position which the SEC now takes in adopting revised rule 14d-
8.14' In addition, the Commission's assertion that its actions have
insured investor protection 146 presupposes a correct determination
of what shareholder interests merit protection. The various and
sometimes conflicting concerns of investors, however, complicate
the meaning of "investor protection. '" 47 Thus, ascertaining which
of securities announced to be purchased.
4. The person who proposes to make a tender bid may omit to disclose, in ap-
proaching others to join as members of a "group" as that term is defined in the statute,
the identity, financial responsibility and other material facts with respect to other
members of the "group."
5. The person who has become aware that a tender bid is to be made, or has reason
to believe that such bid will be made, may fail to disclose material facts with respect
thereto to persons who sell to him securities for which the tender bid is to be made.
6. Management of the target company in a tender bid may omit to make timely
disclosure of its position in favor of or in opposition to such bid or change in such
position.
7. A member of management of a target company, or a member of his family, may
proffer their securities in response to the tender bid without disclosing to other share-
holders the material facts with respect to such action.
Additional Consumer Protection in Corporate Takeovers and Increasing the Securities Act
Exemptions for Small Businessmen: Hearings on S. 336 and S. 3431 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1970).
143. Proposal Release, supra note 28, at 85,145 ("The Commission intends to evaluate
the entire regulatory scheme applicable to tender offers, including these economic issues.").
See supra notes 32 & 56 and accompanying text. Of 41 interested parties who filed com-
ments on the proposed revision of rule 14d-8 with the Commission, 26 supported the SEC's
position, 13 opposed it, and 2 were neutral on the proposal. DIVIsIoN OF CORPORATE FINANCE,
supra note 56, at 4-5. Additionally, three of the ten commentators who considered whether
the Commission had the authority to promulgate revised rule 14d-8 maintained that the
SEC has the requisite authority, while four said it does not and three "believed that the
issue is unclear." Id. at 11.
144. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 56 & 135-36 and accompanying text.
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investor interests to protect is more appropriate for Congress to
determine through debate and legislation than for the Commission
to determine through the promulgation of rules. This Recent De-
velopment now will analyze the legislative history of the Williams
Act and the recent decisions of the Krouse and Jacobs courts and
will argue that the SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority when it
adopted revised rule 14d-8.
A. The Legislative History of the Williams Act
While the congressional debates are sufficiently general in na-
ture to preclude a clear conclusion on the intended scope of the
SEC's rulemaking authority, 148 the discussions never indicate that
Congress considered the SEC's rulemaking power to be "plenary"
in the sense that the Commission could alter statutory require-
ments. 14' Similarly, the House and Senate reports on the 1970
amendments mention the rulemaking authority of section 14(e)
without specifying the limitations on SEC action. The Commis-
sion, like Senator Williams, emphasizes the importance of requir-
ing sufficient disclosure during the rulemaking process.1 50 Indeed,
one may argue that meaningful disclosure does not occur unless
the proposed beneficiaries of that disclosure have sufficient time to
carefully consider the disclosed information. Nevertheless, given
that the express purpose of the Williams Act is to avoid providing
any advantages to target management at the expense of the bid-
der,151 the evaluation of revised rule 14d-8 must accommodate the
rule's detrimental effects on bidders and, if one accepts the propo-
sition that tender offers are beneficial for society as a whole, its
impact on American society.152
In the context of multiple proration pools and the length of
the proration period itself, the only specific indications of congres-
sional intent conflict with any expansion of the ten day period. 5"
Although the general purpose of investor protection may support
the Commission's position, the specific legislative rejection of a
proration period extending over the life of a tender offer1 " clearly
148. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
149. The Krouse court had characterized the rulemaking authority of the SEC as "ple-
nary." See supra text accompanying note 101; infra text accompanying note 166.
150. See supra notes 31-46 & 135 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 56.
153. See supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
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should control over general declarations, particularly since the
question tests the very limits of statutory language. The congres-
sional hearings on the Williams Act do not set forth any specific
reason for adopting the ten day proration period other than the
practice of the New York Stock Exchange."5 Nevertheless, the
hearings do demonstrate that the appropriate committees did con-
sider the length of the pro rata period.156 Notwithstanding one's
propensity to find fault with the process of congressional decision-
making, the actual attention that legislators focused on the pro
rata provision in committee confirms that Congress knowingly re-
jected a requirement similar in effect to revised rule 14d-8. 157 Fur-
thermore, a number of commentators have maintained that actions
which increase the expense and difficulty of tender offers harm in-
vestors by curbing the appetite of potential bidders."'8 If this the-
ory on the effects of tender offer regulation accurately reflects the
psychology of tender offers, the SEC has contravened the same
general congressional purpose on which it has relied.
The legislative history of the Williams Act clearly articulates
the congressional desire to protect investors, but the current de-
bate over tender offer regulation reveals disagreement on which
shareholder interests merit the most protection. Some commenta-
tors159 - including Chairman Shad 60 and Commissioner Tread-
way 16' - have argued against regulations that may detrimentally
affect tender offers while attempting to protect the right of inves-
tors to realize higher premiums from escalating bids in a takeover
battle. Nevertheless, other commentators,16 2 such as the other
three members of the Commission, 6 s have expressed dismay with
the failure of tender offer regulation to safeguard the right of in-
vestors to make informed investment decisions. In this sense the
merits of rule 14d-8 intertwine with the SEC's authority to adopt
the rule.
The original ten day proration period of section 14(d)(6) ap-
parently compromises between no proration period, which would
expedite the tender offer at the expense of informed shareholder
155. See supra text accompanying notes 128-32; supra note 120.
156. See supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 56.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 56.
163. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
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decisionmaking, and a proration period extending over the life of
the offer, which perhaps would aid investor decisionmaking at the
expense of the frequency of tender offers. Such an analysis of the
ten day period, therefore, comports with. the congressionally pro-
fessed position of neutrality between a bidder and target manage-
ment.164 Although a majority of the SEC felt that current tender
offer practice had become incompatible with informed investor
decisionmaking, e5 the division among the commissioners high-
lights the difference of opinion that still predominates debate over
tender offer regulation. In light of this conflict of views on the
proper approach to investor protection, Congress, rather than the
SEC, should have been the body to consider any proposed change
in the pro rata acceptance requirements of the Williams Act. In
short, the Commission's rulemaking authority under sections 14(e)
and 23(a) simply does not support the SEC's alteration of a con-
gressionally crafted resolution of competing policy concerns.
B. Recent Judicial Evaluations of the Williams Act
Perhaps the Krouse court would have upheld the challenge to
the SEC rule in question if the rule had contravened an express
statutory provision, but that court's characterization of the Com-
mission's authority under section 14(e) as "plenary power"'' 6 cer-
tainly demonstrates a strong presumption in favor of the Commis-
sion's activities. The Commission itself apparently endorses such
an interpretation. Nevertheless, the court in Jacobs simply re-
jected the contention-arising largely from the SEC release that
proposed revised rule 14d-8-that the use of multiple proration
pools violates the Williams Act.16 7 The reasoning of the Jacobs
court may indicate that even if the SEC could adopt a rule varying
the provisions of section 14(d)(6), the use of multiple proration
pools does not constitute a "fraudulent, manipulative, or decep-
tive" practice under section 14(e). Thus, section 14(e) could not be
the basis for action against multiple proration pools. If the Com-
mission could not promulgate the rule pursuant to section 14(e),
164. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying note 101. The SEC's adoption of revised rule 14d-8
apparently would not qualify as "arbitrary and capricious" under the three-part test that
the Krouse court articulated. See supra note 89. Both of the Commission's releases compre-
hensively identify the relevant factors and the manner in which the SEC related the adop-
tion of revised rule 14d-8 to those concerns.
167. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
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then it could rely only on the very general rulemaking mandate of
section 23(a). Although the Krouse court's superficial analysis of
the SEC's section 23(a) authority reflects that court's great defer-
ence for the Commission's rulemaking, the availability of other
more direct sources of authority reduces the significance of section
23(a) in that context."6 8 If the SEC could not promulgate rule 14d-
8 under the more appropriate authority of section 14(e), the Com-
mission should be unable to rely on the "catch-all" authority of
section 23(a) to contravene an express provision of the Exchange
Act. The differing conclusions of the Jacobs court and the SEC
concerning the validity of multiple proration pools merely high-
light an immediate need for congressional consideration of the
problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The SEC's adoption of revised rule 14d-8, which effectively al-
ters the requirements of section 14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act, may
signal a pressing need for wholesale revisions of the Williams Act.
In the release adopting revised rule 14d-8, the Commission an-
nounced its intention to reexamine the entire regulatory structure
applicable to tender offers."6 9 The basic difficulty with any regula-
tion of tender offers, however, is that new regulations merely evoke
imaginative responses from lawyers and investment bankers. 70
The SEC, therefore, must retain sufficient rulemaking authority to
provide the congressionally prescribed regulatory structure with
the flexibility necessary to adapt to changes in practice and to han-
dle new problems expeditiously.
The SEC, of course, often has exercised its rulemaking author-
ity in connection with the other provisions of section 14 of the Ex-
change Act without contradicting statutory requirements.1 7 1, This
history suggests that congressional attempts to define broad sub-
stantive and procedural guidelines for tender offers-guidelines
which the SEC has amplified and clarified by rule-generally have
not fared badly in spite of the rapid changes that affect tender
168. See supra notes 81-110 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 143.
170. See House Hearings on Williams Act, supra note 42, at 18 (testimony of Mr.
Manuel Cohen) ("We think the House bill provides additional protections for stockholders
in this respect and that, in view of the almost infinite variety in the terms of most tender
offers, which are limited only by the ingenuity of the offeror and his counsel, some flexibility
through rulemaking is needed.").
171. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1-.14d-7 (1983); id. §§ 240.14e-1-.14e-3.
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offer practice. In the case of revised rule 14d-8, however, the fail-
ure of the Williams Act properly to accommodate the multistep
transaction has prompted the SEC to overreach and distort its
rulemaking authority under section 14(e). Congress, not the Com-
mission, should determine whether a problem exists in this area
and if so, what action is appropriate.
The SEC clearly has demonstrated a suspicion that the ex-
isting regulatory structure is inadequate to deal with the increas-
ingly popular multistep transaction which includes a partial tender
offer. The difficulty and the time-consuming nature of congres-
sional action confirm the advantages of SEC action in terms of the
speed with which the Commission may respond to current trends
in tender offer practice, but the constitutional system of this na-
tion does not countenance the empowering of an agency to alter
congressionally imposed requirements. One might argue that the
Commission, despite its questionable authority, had to promulgate
revised rule 14d-8 to force Congress to address the problem of mul-
tiple proration pools. Notwithstanding any such possible motiva-
tion, however, the Commission's excursion beyond the permissible
parameters of its rulemaking authority has harmed the credibility
of the current regulatory structure. Congress, the courts, or the
Commission itself should invalidate revised rule 14d-8 and allow
Congress to review its earlier resolution of the conflicting policies
in section 14(d)(6).
DAVID JONATHAN WHITE
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